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Introduction
Before the Second World War even began, the British already faced a dire situation in
India. Cries rang-out across India for independence and the Raj spent the 1920s and 1930s
containing, quelling, and even violently suppressing dissent. As trouble brewed in Europe, the
Indian National Congress Party called for independence and their shout was echoed by Muhammad
Ali Jinnah's demand for Pakistan. In 1939, when Lord Linlithgow declared India at war without
consulting a single Indian, he not only caused Congress to resign, but lit the flame that would
expedite the end of British rule in India. As the war dragged on, it became clear to all involved
that for the British to ensure the cooperation and assistance of Indians to beat the Nazis and the
Japanese, they would have to give India her independence.
The challenges and experiences of the Second World War did more than bring about the
physical end of the Raj. They also wore away at the colonial ideology that had persisted in British
India since the days of the 1857 mutiny. This ideology was martial race theory. This paper seeks
to explore how the Second World War challenged martial race theory and created tensions in the
official British mindset. Wartime needs and challenges to recruitment, the estranged relationship
between the British and the Sikhs, and the Indian National Army and the British experience with
it contradicted and challenged martial race theory. As the war progressed, some British officials
remained well entrenched in these beliefs, while others adapted a nuanced or new view in light of
new evidence.

Historiography and Methodology
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I became intrigued in how the Second World War challenged martial race theory while
looking through a volume of sources on the Indian National Army.1 In this document series, I
found a letter from General Headquarters to the G.O.C army, dated March of 1943, regarding
subversive activities directed against the British Indian army. The author, who was anonymous,
expressed concern how the army and its makeup had changed, including the expansion of
recruitment beyond the martial races.2 This source would come to play a key role in my research,
and it raised additional questions for me. What were other British officials saying about the martial
races and the army? What did the Indian National Army look like on a communal level and what
did British officials have to say about it? With these questions in the back of my mind, I turned to
the secondary material (discussed below) to investigate what historians had said about the Indian
Army, the Indian National Army, and martial race theory itself. After this, my research involved
alternating between the secondary sources, the primary sources historians referenced, and several
volumes of government documents.3
The story of India in the Second World War has exploded in recent years and the British
Indian Army has been the subject of consistent focus through varied lenses. Pradeep Barua
examined the institutional and organizational reforms, including the establishment of a
professional officer corps, that transformed the Indian Army from a police unit into a modern
army. In viewing India as a historically specific case distinct from other imperial armies, he argued
that modernization took place due to a variety of factors on both the British and Indian side, and
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that their relationship changed significantly during this process. Barua also argued that their
perceptions of modernization, as well as the British-Indian and British-British interactions
determined the path these reforms took.4 Anirudh Desphpande explored why reform in the British
Indian army remained largely theoretical even as India held up the empire. He argued that, in the
end, the Second World War did change the Indian Army, but this change ultimately worked against
the British.5 Tan Tai Young examined how, after the Mutiny of 1857, the British turned to Punjab
for military recruitment and how the politics of Punjab were militarized by its use as the “sword
of the Raj.”6 Christopher Alan Bayly and Tim Harper told the story of the forgotten armies of Asia,
spanning from India to Malaya. They chronicled the experience of the British Indian Army, the
Indian National Army, the Burma Independence army, the communist guerilla army in Malaya,
and even the Japanese forces invading India. These “forgotten armies” included the many SouthAsian laborers who fought and died as well. They sought to shed light upon the histories of these
armies that were pushed into the sidelines because of other historical happenings, such as Partition,
and demonstrated how their stories were all intertwined.7 Kate Imy explored the experience and
response of soldiers within the British Indian Army to efforts to organize them based on their
identities, as well as control them. She focused on the impact of different religious groups being
considered more or less militant and how this affected their sense of identity during both war and
peace time. She sought to show not just the physical battles they were facing, but their internal
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ones as well.8 Tarak Barkawi used the Indian Army and other armies of the British Raj to examine
the relationship between the army and society. He questioned how men are made into soldiers and
why they decide to participate in war in an “ordinary” imperial context.9 Srinath Raghavan
provided what he considered to be a “comprehensive” and “integrated” account of India in the
Second World War. He explored five connected pieces to put together this narrative: the strategic
dimension of the war with India as the centerpiece of the British empire; the internal dimensions
of the war; domestic politics; economic and social dimensions; and the war front itself. In addition
to these themes, he explored the impact the war had on India as well, both short-term and longterm.10 Yasmin Khan sought to move past crediting the contributions of India to the war and
instead told a social history of the Indian experience, focusing on the connection between society
and warfare. She examined how the war reshaped India, questioning the impact of total-war on the
home front, as well as the rapid and intense militarization that took place. She paid attention to the
diverse war-time experiences of people of all nationalities across the subcontinent. In doing so,
Khan raised the question of the social costs of the war and the impact it had on groups not usually
considered in the narrative (prostitutes, noncombatants, camp followers, peasants in the most rural
villages).11 Daniel Marston filled in the gaps of the histories of the British Indian Army, the British
Empire, Partition, and India and Pakistan. He explored the history of the army in terms of its
creation and background, decision making, and its ethnic makeup. He discussed how the army
reached 1945 in terms of structure and function, and the changes that occurred during this period,

8

Kate Imy, Faith Fighters: Identity and Power in the British Indian Army (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2019).
9
Tarak Barkawi, Soldiers of Empire Indian and British Armies in World War II. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2017).
10
Srinath Raghavan, India's War: World War II and the Making of Modern South Asia (New York: Basic Books,
2016).
11
Yasmin Khan, India at War: The Subcontinent and the Second World War, (New York: Oxford University Press,
2015).

6
which he described as a “renaissance.” Marston argued that these changes and the increased
professionalization of the army contributed to the role it played post-war during the chaos and
violence of Partition, a role that has not received enough attention and credit.12

The Martial Races
In 1857, beginning in the Bengal Army, sepoys in various units of the British Indian army
mutinied. The violence and chaos erupted in villages of various provinces of India as well,
shocking British residents in India despite long-standing grievances and discontent. The Raj lost
control over much of north-central India and it took the Raj over a year to brutally reestablish
control over certain areas.13 The mutiny of 1857 left behind a “searing trauma” that forced the Raj
to begin to reexamine the liberal reforms of the previous period, as well as the way it organized,
ran, and presented its empire.14 One of these changes included the categorization of Indian groups
based on certain attributes they considered favorable or unfavorable. The preferred group were
referred to as the martial races and they consisted of the communities that had remained loyal
during the mutiny. The British relied on them to serve the empire, particularly in the armed forces
where the power lied, and the problem had begun. The martial races were characterized as
masculine, brave, strong, and well equipped for fighting. Martial races were also considered to be
rural in nature, which meant they were free of the complications and indiscretions of city
dwellers.15 However, above all else, they were loyal, obedient, and incapable of biting the hand
that provided for them and reigned them in.16
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The inside cover of The Martial Races of India by George MacMunn (1933)

In 1933, Lieutenant General Sir George MacMunn published a book entitled The Martial
Races of India. MacMunn was a high-ranking officer with an extensive career in the British
military and spent a great portion of his career in India. Due to his rank and role, his work can be
used as an example of the official mindset regarding the martial races and martial race theory itself
in the pre-war years. In sharing the histories of the martial races, as well as speculating about their
future, MacMunn believed that he was writing for the public and that his knowledge could help
young British officers understand India and its people. This in and of itself is telling. For British
imperial success, a guidebook was necessary to decipher the tangled web of identity in India.17
In the first chapter of his book, “The Martial Castes and Races,” MacMunn characterized
the martial races and provided an ethnology of Indians. MacMunn argued that to understand India,
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one had to understand the martial races and their importance. Unlike with the British or even the
Germans, it was relevant to distinguish between the martial and feminine in India because most of
the population had neither skill nor courage. In defining the martial races, MacMunn noted that,
“the martial races, as explained, are largely the product of the original white races,” and this
referred to Aryans. He also reported that the caste system developed to protect whiteness. This
meant that groups considered to be martial were as closely linked to whiteness as Indians could be
and that this played a key role in what made them so remarkable.18
When describing the service of the martial races in the First World War, MacMunn praised
their success and bravery in the face of horrible conditions and brutal fighting. He maintained that
these men were faced with great challenges yet rose to the occasion and showed devotion in doing
so. In this account, MacMunn listed the groups he considered to be martial which included Sikhs,
Punjabi Muslims, Pathans, Gurkhas, Jats, Garhwalis, and Mahrattas. He characterized these men
as “the cream of India.” MacMunn's description here captured the overarching picture of what it
meant to be martial in the eyes of the British and the value of such a status. That is, an Indian man
had to be brave, loyal, and a good fighter, and these qualifications made him better than other
Indian men. 19

The Make-Up and Expansion of the Army
As the Second World War began in September of 1939, the British government believed
that they would not need the British Indian Army to fight in Europe. They argued that the army
should remain in India to deal with domestic issues, as well as maintain a presence in the Northwest
Frontier Province to secure India on that front. As a result of this hesitance, the British Indian
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Army was not significantly expanded from 1939 to May 1940. In 1939, the army consisted of a
force of about 200,000 men. Reports from June of 1940 indicated that only 20,029 men had been
recruited since then. Though other groups were somewhat included in this effort, the army mostly
limited itself to the traditional martial races.20

A 1947 map of British India with the Punjab province outlined.

In discussing the make-up of the British Indian Army and the presence of the martial races,
it is important to look particularly at the army’s provincial and communal demographics before
and during the war. Punjab was viewed as the home of the martial races, and this placed it at the
center of recruitment. Up until the 1930s, Punjabi Muslims, Sikhs, Rajputs, Gurkhas, Dogras,
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Pathans, Marathas, Kumaonis, and Garthwalis were the army’s primary targeted groups. 21 Some
considered Punjabi Muslims to be the favorite among these groups.22 Others considered the Sikhs
to be the favorite and viewed them as “the living embodiment of perfect soldiers.”23 Of the martial
races, Sikhs were the most disproportionately represented in the British Indian Army. By the First
World War, Sikhs accounted for 20 to 30% of soldiers despite making up less than 1% of the total
Indian population.24 This focus on Punjab remained consistent throughout the war, even with
efforts to recruit outside of the province and the martial classes. In 1943, Punjab still provided 37%
of army recruits. Of these Punjabi recruits, Muslims and Pathans made up more than 25%; Jat
Sikhs made up 7% and Jat Hindus made up 7%.25
The British Indian Army expanded from 200,000 men in 1939 to 2.5 million men by 1945.
This was entirely a volunteer army and conscription was never imposed.26 Lord Linlithgow, the
Viceroy of India from 1936 until 1943, embraced and pushed for greater Indianization of the armed
forces. During the “phony war” period of 1939 through 1940, Linlithgow advocated that army
recruitment should be expanded outside of Punjab. There were two potential reasons for this. First,
Linlithgow believed that by including a wider range of Indians in the armed forces that the Raj
could counterbalance the difficulties and negative optics of Congress’ anti-war position. Second,
Linlithgow knew that during the First World War, the army had pulled from different provinces
and classes, and that measure had proved successful and worthwhile.27 As the war progressed and
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the “phony war” period ended, the demand for fighting men opened up the door for expanded
recruitment. This need was exacerbated by problems with other classes in terms of lowered
recruitment and desertion, as well as the rising agricultural costs.28 For example, by the end of
1941, recruitment of Jat Sikhs had dropped by half the rate of recruitment for 1940.29

Lord Linlithgow

As a result, the recruitment of non-martial races rapidly expanded between 1940 and 1942.
The British needed more fighting men and India offered a smorgasbord. Commander-in-Chief
Auchinleck wrote to Amery in March of 1941, “There is plenty of good untouched material which
we can and should use.”30 New groups were introduced to military service and among them were
Bihari tribes, Hos, Oraons, Mundas, Santals, Chamars, Nepalis, Gilgits, Kabirpanthis, Mahars,
Oriyas, Assamese, and Bengalis.31

Political Strains on the British and Sikh Relationship
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The special relationship between the British and the Sikhs had already begun to wear thin
in the 1920s and 1930s and deteriorated further as the war progressed. As the Indian government
underwent greater democratization and Indianization, the Sikhs sought to carve out a political
identity for themselves equivalent to that of other groups (i.e., Hindus and Muslims). Tension
increased in the 1940s with the Muslim League’s demands for Pakistan and the questions it raised
about the political, social, and cultural future of the Sikhs. This occurred first with the Lahore
Resolution of 1940, which ignited fears of a Muslim state in Punjab. This fear and anger were
intensified in 1942 with the Cripps Mission, which Sikhs interpreted as Punjab being surrendered
to the Muslim League.32
Scholars have noted that Sikhs were in a difficult, divisive, and messy political situation as
the Second World War began. They were contending with both the Congress Party and the Muslim
League and were unsure of which side to choose in the fight. Congress offered a whole, free India
united under one Indian nationality. However, Congress leaders strongly opposed the longstanding imperial privileges the Sikhs had enjoyed, such as separate electorates based on race and
religion. The Muslim League offered little more than Sikander Hayat Khan, the Premier of Punjab
and a leader of the Unionist Party, and Jinnah’s promises that their identity, culture, and
opportunities would always be safe in Punjab and Punjab would be safe in Pakistan. Little stock
was put in these words and promises.33 These two options sharply divided Sikh leaders along
ideological lines regarding the war. The split extended to recruitment and enlistment. More
nationalist Sikhs opposed the war on moral grounds, citing the war as imperialist. Others
recognized the long-term political benefits of assisting the British, viewing enlisting and remaining
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in good graces as part of a quid pro quo deal. Across the board, however, the Sikh political body
recognized the value of a large presence in the armed forces when the breakdown of empire would
eventually come, and the accompanying chaos unfolded. Political problems, both those between
Sikhs, Congress, the Muslim League, and the ideological division between the Sikhs themselves,
eventually took its toll on Sikh recruitment. The military had been concerned about the situation
with the Sikhs since the 1930s. A 1940 military survey of the situation described Sikh soldiers as
restless and remarked that things were not business as usual in the community.34

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League and Sikander Hayat Khan, the Premier of Punjab

Sikh Mutiny in Egypt
In the early stages of the war, Sikhs committed mutiny in India and other places, including
Egypt, and other squadrons refused to fight overseas. These actions led the British to temporarily
pause Sikh recruitment, but British military officials maintained that Sikhs were loyal.35 In
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December of 1939 in Egypt, Sikh communists mutinied in the Motorized Transport (MT)
Company.36 According to official notes from Deputy Director Jenkin of the Intelligence Bureau,
Sikhs were more than just participants in the mutiny: they were active leaders. The report
concluded that, “Sikhs were in the majority and to the fore in the manufacture of trouble.” Several
explanations for the mutiny were put forward, including “dissatisfaction, fear, organizational
defects, and discipline which was not all that it should have been.” This was a common explanation
the British gave for mutinies. They would blame the breakdown of order on the acts of individuals,
a couple of “bad apples” in the barrel, rather than admit a larger problem was at play.37 Following
the mutiny, the men were jailed until they were court martialed in 1944. Once the trials concluded,
many of these men were released and sent back to Punjab to be monitored by the government.38
These reports are telling of how military officials perceived the Sikhs and their involvement
in the mutiny, as well as how Sikhs perceived their own status. In this report, Stephen Olver of the
Home Department reported that one mutineer, Waryam Singh, had been characterized as a “ringleader of sorts” in the initial reports following the mutiny. He did not consider him to be a threat
to security, but still believed he should be restricted to his village. V. Sahay, also of the Home
Department, reported that original documentations had described Singh as “thoroughly unreliable
and disaffected” and reported that he gave his full support to the mutiny. Additionally, Sahay noted
that Singh had pushed other Sikh leaders to convince Hindus and Muslims to join them so the

36

Tan Tai Young, Garrison State: Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab 1849-1947, 286-289
Brandon Marsh, Ramparts of Empire: India’s Afghan Frontier and British Imperialism, 1918-1948 (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 109.
38
Army Mutineers in Egypt--Official Notings, July 7th, 1944, in Partha Sarathi Gupta (ed.) Towards Freedom:
Documents on the movement for Independence in India 1943-1944, vol. 3, section 15 (Delhi, India: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 34.
37

15
Sikhs would not be blamed for the incident. Even if this was not the perception of all military
officials involved, it is clear Singh and others considered themselves targets for “bad-naming.”39
The Punjab government objected to the release of these men and their return to their homes.
According to Phillip Mason, Secretary of the Home Department, the Punjab government had two
main reasons for their stance. First, they feared the influence these men could have on military
recruitment- a matter already of concern among officials. Second, they feared that the mutineers,
as disaffected, fighting men, would be contacted by Indian National Army agents.40 Mason
attempted to convince the Punjab government to support the decision. He did this by reminding
them of the reasons the men were detained in the first place--justifications that had not quite panned
out. First, they were all believed to have been either instigators or sympathizers of the mutiny.
Second, officials believed that the men had acted in complete secrecy without revealing their plans,
meaning their freedom posed threats to security.41
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Japanese Invasion of South-East Asia & The Impact of Quit India

India and Malaya during the Second World War, showing the proximity of Singapore to British territory.

In the wake of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese rode a high of aggression and military success
into the early months of 1942. They invaded South-East Asia quickly and efficiently, defeating
British imperial forces spread throughout the region and claiming control of various parts of their
Eastern empire. The invasion of Burma began in December of 1941 and the Japanese claimed
Hong Kong by Christmas. Just over a month later, the Japanese seized Malaya, as well. The most
shocking and severe blow came on February 15th, 1942, when Japan captured Singapore after a
week of fighting.42 This campaign was devastating for the British with significantly fewer losses
for the Japanese. The British army lost 13,000 men in Malaya and another 8,000 in Singapore.
Over 130,000 men from Singapore were taken as Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) and over half
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of them were Indian.43 With Singapore under their belt, Japanese forces were now at India’s
doorstep44 and it became clear that the British had severely underestimated the Japanese at a great
cost. Threat of invasion loomed over India and British officials waited for an attack for the next
four months until the Allied victory at the Battle of Midway in June. Historian Yasmin Khan
described the impact of this event as “explosive” and stated that, “it is no coincidence that 1942
would be a year of extraordinary dislocation and unrest in India.”45

Gandhi announces Quit India

The climax of the unrest of 1942 came in August with the launch of the “Quit India” civil
disobedience campaign. In a speech in Bombay on August 8th, Mohandas Gandhi, the face, and
leader of the Indian National Congress Party, demanded independence and immediate British
withdrawal from India. He provided his followers with a new marching order, “Do or Die,” which
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meant they would not stop until India was free. Gandhi and the Congress Party leadership,
including Jawaharlal Nehru, were arrested within hours of the speech, and remained imprisoned
for the duration of the war. However, the flame had been lit and bottled-up anger boiled over
among the masses across the Presidencies, other major cities, and several provinces, like the United
Provinces, Central Provinces, and Bengal. In major urban areas, like Bombay, thousands of Indians
joined protests, sit-ins, and marches. This coalition was led largely by young people, who, though
they admired and respected Gandhi, were impatient and less dedicated to civil disobedience. In
rural areas, peasants became active as well, but were more violent as historical grievances and
rampant inequality, exacerbated by wartime trouble, melted into “Quit India.” Crime and disorder
followed, empowered further by the vagueness of “Do or Die.” In both rural and urban areas, it
was clear that the Congress Party had lost control of the movement, which troubled Congress
leadership as acts of rebellion were carried out in their name. As August continued, demonstrators
continued to try and disrupt the war effort. This involved acts of sabotage, such as breaking
equipment or railway workers serving as spies. Police and officials sympathetic to the movement
collaborated with the protestors and covered for them instead of enforcing law and order. Khan
characterized Quit India as “determined sabotage, insurrection and disruption,” and asserted that
it represented some of the Raj’s worst fears coming to fruition.46
This worry about the fragility of the imperial system and the fear it could all fall apart due
to both interior and exterior forces lingered well into 1943. In the beginning months of 1943,
communications among British officials were largely focused on Gandhi’s fast, how to address it,
and the implications his death in jail would pose to the Raj. In February of 1943, Lord Wavell,
then still Commander-in-Chief, wrote to Lord Linlithgow to provide his assessment on how
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Gandhi’s fast would impact the army. His thoughts on the threat posed by the situation expressed
mixed, complicated views that both embraced and shied away from martial race theory. Wavell
asserted that soldiers were largely indifferent to the situation or did not believe this matter
concerned the army. He was not concerned about Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers (VCOs),
Indian Commissioned Officers (ICOs), and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), because even
those who identified as nationalists recognized that defeating the Axis powers was of the utmost
importance. VCOs typically emerged from the traditional classes with long-standing family
relationships with the army. ICOs were typically educated Punjabi Muslims or Sikhs who came
from the traditional, martial classes.47

Lord Archibald Wavell
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Wavell also remarked that some men, particularly senior VCOs, might welcome the
moment, as “a source of embarrassment which showed signs of interfering with the vested interests
of the ‘Martial’ classes had been removed.” Wavell’s quotations around the word martial here are
worth noting. He also used them to discuss “fighting” men earlier in the letter. It seems Wavell
used quotations around words and ideas that were not necessarily his, but he still bought into them
on some level. Several sentences later, Wavell noted that the group that caused him the most
concern were personnel (clerks and technicians) recently recruited from “‘educated’ politically
minded classes.” He admitted there were certainly no definite signs of trouble but maintained that
they were clearly supporters of Congress. For this reason, he also warned Linlithgow to watch the
Indian Medical Services. Wavell’s mixed thoughts and contradictions here suggest several things.
First, though he seemed less willing to admit it, he distrusted the new classes within the armed
forces. Their “education” (as Wavell put it) and Congress affiliation contributed to the risk they
presented, and their background contrasted with the rural, less educated group associated with the
traditional, martial classes. Unlike large parts of the army, who perhaps did not care about the
connection of their position and high politics, these new personnel did.48
Others within the British imperial system expressed views more clear-cut and directly in
line with old beliefs and martial race theory. Among them were individuals from General
Headquarters, the office of the Commander and Chief of India, one of the most conservative forces
in British India. In March of 1943, General Headquarters wrote to the G.O.C Army regarding
subversive activities directed towards the Indian Army and their strategies to counter these attacks.
This letter expressed traditional values regarding India and the Indian army, referencing the martial
races directly. In the wake of Quit India, the author of this letter, an anonymous official within
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General Headquarters, compared the Congress Party to the Japanese and characterized them both
as assailants of the army. The author also noted how the situation in the army had “radically
changed” since pre-war times. He characterized the Indian Army as a “mercenary army” before
the war and its loyalty was based on four factors. First, the army’s recruitment was from “classes
with long-standing martial and professional traditions.” These groups were loyal to the Sarkar (the
landlord) and King, and their loyalty outweighed their class interests. Second, the army’s
leadership was made up of experienced British officers who could “command respect and affection
of their men.” Third, good pay that was better than what civilian life offered. Fourth, competition
for roles and the ability to move up in rank. After providing these four reasons for loyalty in prewar times, the author lamented how recruitment, officer makeup, and competition for roles no
longer worked that way. He questioned if pay was enough to balance out the loss of the other three
factors, and ultimately doubted that it alone could keep the army loyal. The author stressed to the
G.O.C army that they should not be complacent and, using italics, made the following point very
clear: “It is also essential that efforts should be made continuously to impress on men, especially
of the recently introduced classes, they are fighting in India’s interests and that a Japanese victory
would be disastrous for their own future.”49

The Indian National Army
The Indian National Army (INA) was three separate armies of similar names with the same
goal in mind: create a force of Indian POWs to fight alongside the Axis powers against the British
in the name of Indian independence. The concept was first conceived by Subhas Chandra Bose, a
radical Indian nationalist, and the President of the National Congress Party from 1938-1939.
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Bose’s ideology continually conflicted with that of the more moderate members of the Congress
Party, including Gandhi and particularly where use of force was concerned, and this divided the
party into separate wings. After fleeing house-arrest to Germany, Bose created the first form of the
INA, the Free India Legion (FIL), in May of 1941 using Indian POWs captured in North Africa
by the Italians and Germans. They were an Indian force fighting under German high command,
but Bose’s passion was not returned by Indian POWs. In December of 1941, he received a cold
welcome by Indian POWs held in Annaburg and, of the sixty-eight men the Germans deemed
eligible for service, only twenty-one volunteered to serve. By early 1943, of the 15,000 Indian
POWs in Axis custody, only 2,000 joined. Only one VCO enlisted, and zero NCOs volunteered.
In February of 1943, Bose would leave for Japan, dealing the final blow to the IFL. There were
various reasons this first attempt failed and the later versions of the INA would learn from these
mistakes. In the FIL, Indian officers would not be allowed to keep their rank and would have to
start over, albeit in an expedited process. Many officers, especially VCOs, were unwilling to
sacrifice their family traditions, benefits, and privileges, and even their complicated sense of
loyalty. As a result, the FIL would be led by Germans, creating problems with morale, and even
the more nationalist Indian POWs did not buy that Germany cared about Indian independence. The
FIL also failed in part because of the roles and responsibilities they were given. Bose maintained
that FIL should only be used in the Middle East in the push towards Afghanistan and India because
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soldiers had to feel like they were fighting for Indian independence. Despite this, the Nazis used
the FIL for policing in the Netherlands and the Atlantic wall, which further damaged morale.50

Subhas Chandra Bose

As Bose was launching the IFL in Europe, Japan worked towards creating its own Indian
army to use against the British. In September of 1941, the Japanese sent Major Fujiwara Iwaichi,
an intelligence officer, to Bangkok to meet with the Indian Independence League (ILL) to discuss
how they could help one another and the creation of what the Japanese called a “Greater East-Asia
Co-Prosperity Sphere.” During this, Iwachi formed a relationship with the Sikh ILL leader, Giani
Pritam Singh. Singh encouraged Iwachi’s efforts, believing Indian troops in Malaya could be
convinced to turn against the British.51 Their efforts proved valuable in December of 1941 when
Japanese troops launched a surprise attack on the 1/14th Punjab regiment at the Thai-Malayan
border where Indian forces were defeated and captured after surrendering. Among the detainees
was Captain Mohan Singh, a Jat Sikh and nationalist ICO who was frustrated with the lackluster
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British response to the question of Indian independence even as India fought to protect Britain’s
from Germany and the Japanese. Iwachi pitched the idea of creating an army for the purpose of
freeing India and managed to convince Captain Singh it was a route worth pursuing. He was placed
in charge of an Indian POW camp, then eventually became the Commander of the INA.52 Not only
had a Jat Sikh (a group considered by many to be the best of the martial races) joined the INA, but
he had also enthusiastically served as a leader. In February of 1942, the 229 soldiers of the 1/14th
Punjab who joined the INA were among the Japanese forces who captured Singapore. 65,000
Indian troops were taken as POWs and 20,000 of them joined the INA; the rest would remain
prisoners in Japanese camps for the remainder of the war. Among these men were 400 officers,
who were allowed to keep their respective rank in this INA, and half were from the medical
services. 150 VCOs joined the INA.53

Captain Mohan Singh (right)

The INA under Captain Singh’s leadership soared during those first few months. In August
of 1942, Quit India boosted participation in the INA and by September, they had a fighting force
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of 16,000 under three brigades named Gandhi, Nehru, and Azad (free). However, the honeymoon
phase did not last as the marriage-of-convenience between Captain Singh and the Japanese quickly
burned out. From the start, Captain Singh wanted Indians fighting in India, not Malaya, and wanted
the two armies to be on equal footing. He repeatedly clashed with the Japanese over the autonomy
of the INA from the Japanese, how the INA should be used, the issue of the ILL, and Japanese
dedication to Indian independence. Ultimately, as Captain Singh became increasingly more
paranoid about the Japanese and repeatedly tried to assert his authority, he was arrested and
remained in prison for the remainder of the war.54

Bose (right) meeting with Tojo (left) in Tokyo
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Subhas Chandra Bose, having abandoned the FIL, returned to South-East Asia several
months later in mid-1943. On June 12th, 1943, Bose would meet with Hideki Tojo, the premier of
Japan and the Commander of the Japanese Army, in Tokyo to discuss the future of the INA. Tojo
reaffirmed his full support to Indian independence, but only pandered to Bose because he viewed
Bose and the INA as a great propaganda tool against the British. That July, Bose became the
Commander of the INA. Bose’s personality was imperative to the success of the third and final
version of the INA.55 Bose, a brilliant politician and writer, was well-received by the Indian public.
This had begun in February of 1942 when Bose launched Azad Hind Radio following the capture
of Singapore. He simplified what was happening and assured Indians that British defeat benefited
Indians and that the Axis powers would free India. Yasmin Khan noted that Bose’s rise and his
words were a “reassuring godsend” to many Indians in those dark times.56 Bose could not only
comfort and inspire the masses, but he could also reel in those on the fence as well. Unlike with
Captain Singh, Indian POWs believed that Bose could go toe to toe with the Japanese. This was
enough to finally earn the support of Captain Shah Nahwaz Khan (who would later be court
martialed for his role in the INA). Khan noted that Bose had a “strange influence” over him and
that he knew Bose could safeguard India’s honor. Despite the affection for Bose, the same
problems Captain Singh faced with the INA persisted. Bose, who wanted to use the INA as an
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offensive weapon, continued to clash with the Japanese, who viewed the INA as better suited as a
propaganda tool.57

Captain Shah Nawaz Khan

The INA and other Japanese-sponsored agents not only represented diverse ethnic,
religious, and provincial identities in India, but also pushed for unification among these groups.
This complicated existing ideas of race, loyalty, and communal division. This diversity and unity
can be observed in both the communications of INA leaders and the makeup of the INA itself. In
their speeches and writings, INA leaders pushed and invoked ideas of a common Indian identity
in the quest for an independent India. Captain Mohan Singh, in a letter written in the common
language that was found in Arkan, instructed his “brothers” to tell all Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs
in the British Indian Army to drop their weapons and join the INA. In doing so, they would become
“an independent soldier of the Independent Army” and all officers would keep their respective
rank.58
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Subhas Chandra Bose also pushed this idea of a common Indian identity in his
communications. Yasmin Khan characterized his first speech over Azad Hind Radio as words of
“faith, unity, and discipline.”59 When Bose announced himself as the new commander of the INA
in August of 1943, he stated, “I regard myself as the servant of thirty-eight crores of my
countrymen who profess different religious faiths.” He promised to protect the interests of each of
these groups and that all Indians could trust him.60
Bose remained consistent in this messaging throughout the remainder of the war, even as
he adjusted his arguments to address his qualms with the Muslim League and the less radical
members of the Indian National Congress Party. On June 19th, 1945, Bose issued a broadcast from
Bangkok addressing Viceroy Wavell’s plan for the Executive Council announced during the Simla
Conference. This plan stipulated that all members of the Executive Council would be Indians aside
from the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief. Bose expressed his frustration with Wavell
attempting to win over Congress and with Congress for considering the deal now (despite their
criticisms of it). He said it was a sign of defeatism and pessimism and, more importantly, it was
unjustified. Bose, incorrectly, believed that the war in East-Asia would be long and hard and that
it would serve India “further opportunities for achieving her independence.” For this reason, he
pushed his followers to hold out and not accept Wavell’s deal. Bose also noted that if Indians
waited until after the July 5th election and, if the Labor Party won, they could use the Labor Party's
desire to take credit for a more advantageous deal. Bose concluded his speech by criticizing those
who complained about Hindus and Muslims receiving equal seats on the Executive Council. He
instructed them to look beyond religious divide and look deeper at the issue. To Bose, religion was
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not the issue, but rather character and the matter of being a patriot. He believed there was no
difference between a nationalist Hindu and a nationalist Muslim. It did not matter who received
the seats as long as they were a nationalist. However, Bose maintained this would not be the case.
The British would give all the Hindu seats to Congress and all the Muslim seats to the League.
The League would then work with the British to render Congress a minority on the Council. To
Bose and the INA, religious and communal identity was irrelevant. It mattered more to them
whether a Muslim or Hindu identified as a nationalist united behind the cause of an India free of
British rule.61
The diversity of the INA can also be observed in its demographic make-up, particularly
along geographic and community lines. 75% of INA volunteers were Punjabi;62 this is significant
given that Punjab only accounted for 37% of army recruits in 1943.63 This included Sikhs who
served as soldiers and as leaders.64 Lord Wavell, during his final months as Commander in Chief,
wrote that “the bulk of active INA personnel are representatives of the classes (Sikhs and PMs
[Punjabi Muslims] in particular) which formed the backbone of the prewar Indian Army.”
However, the INA reached even further than the martial races. Bose extended his scope beyond
Indian POWs to the South Indians of Japanese-occupied Malaya. Bose was particularly interested
in Tamils and those who had worked in the rubber factories.65
In March of 1943, the Madras presidency placed nineteen men on trial for treason against
the crown and acting as enemy agents of the Japanese. Five of the men were found guilty and they
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were both similar and different to one another. They all fell within the same age range of mid to
late 20s. They were all working-class men, occupying careers such as surveyor, foreman, telephone
mechanic, draftsmen, and farmer. All had trained at the Swaraj Institute with the Japanese, which
was funded by the Indian Independence League. They all said they agreed to spy for the money
but had no intention of doing so once home. On a religious and provincial level, they were quite
different. Two of the men were Hindus, one was Muslim, another Sikh, and the final one Christian.
They hailed from various provinces, including Bengal and Punjab. Others were from Travancore.
Special Judge E.E Mack, in his official record of the trial, remarked that “the Territorial and
communal classification of these accused is interesting.”66
The arrests of suspected enemy agents and traitors were not limited to Madras. Between
January and May of 1943, the Chittagong government arrested and detained over three hundred
men under the Defense of India rules. These men also came from a variety of communities,
including Hindus, Muslims, Burmese, and Sikhs. Like the men arrested in Madras, they hailed
from as far-north as Rawalpindi in Punjab and as far south-east as Akyab in Burma.67
British officials expressed particular concern and awe about the presence of both Punjabi
Muslims and Sikhs among INA and Japanese agents. In March of 1943, General Headquarters
noted with panic that Punjabi Muslims and Sikhs could be seen fighting with the Japanese in
Arkan. General Headquarters used this fact to stress the serious reality that all was not right in the
army, and that military officials should not feel complacent. A year later in May of 1944, two boats
full of Japanese agents were caught along the coast and detained. All the men except for one, who
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was from Madras, hailed from Punjab. These men were all either in their 20s or their 50s. Many
were well educated and spoke a variety of English, Hindustani, and Punjabi. Some of the men
spoke all three, while others only spoke one. Some of them had served as Government workers in
a rubber factory in Malaya, while another man was an ex-soldier.68

The Red Fort Trials
Following the Allied victory in the Pacific in August of 1945, the British became
determined to charge INA members, both soldiers and officers, of treason against the crown. They
were particularly interested in prosecuting 7,000 INA soldiers who had tortured others interested
in rejoining the Allies towards the end of the war. Across the board, however, this idea was not
well received. The British were dismayed and even surprised by the widespread support the INA
received. Within the British Indian Army, many officers believed that INA soldiers were
misguided in their decision to join the Axis powers, but they were also sympathetic with INA
soldiers and somewhat grateful for the protection they offered Indian Civilians from the Japanese
and the Burmese. Officers of the martial classes with long-standing careers in the armed forces
neither praised nor bashed INA members. They did not consider them heroes, but they would not
label them as traitors, either. Officers of the newly introduced classes in the technical units (like
GHQ discussed) were openly grateful and supportive of the INA because they had helped bring
independence that much closer. The Indian public echoed this support of the INA. Many Indians,
of all communities, saw INA soldiers as patriots, even if they were wrong to join up with the
Japanese. The Congress Party adopted a similar, but more complex view of the INA. Recently
released from prison and facing an election year, the Congress Party tapped into this dissent and
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used it to their advantage. They also agreed with the nationalist, independence driven spirit of the
INA. However, the Congress Party remained worried about becoming too deeply involved in the
matter, as they feared it would dangerously divide the future army of an independent India.69
The British had their own reservations about prosecuting soldiers as well and this was
largely due to a fear the INA would aggravate communal tensions. The British were concerned
how the situation would affect Sikhs and Muslims, as these groups had been significant
participants in the INA. The soldiers were subsequently released and treated like heroes by the
public.70 This is indicative of how the situation had changed since 1939: the British feared backlash
from the Indian groups they had previously considered the least threatening.

Colonel Prem Sahgal.

The British, however, remained committed to court-martialing INA officers. There were
two main reasons for this. First, there was clearly a desire for justice and punishment. These
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officers, trusted leaders and officials of the British Indian army, had betrayed and abandoned the
Raj in its most desperate hour. In the mind of the British, there was a price to be paid for that.
Second, the memory of Quit India burned into their brains, the British also feared that the Congress
Party would use the INA to launch another revolt. In their minds, prosecuting the others was a way
to send a message and maintain order. In November of 1945, the court-martial began, and the
process lasted until May of 1946. Three officers were initially placed on trial for treason, torture,
and murder: Colonel Prem Sahgal, Lieutenant Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon, and Captain Shah Nawaz
Khan. Capturing the all-Indianness of the INA, Sahgal was a Muslim, Dhillon a Sikh, and Khan a
Hindu; scholars have pointed out the symbolism of such a line-up. All elected to be represented
by the Indian Defence Committee and Nehru served as one of their three attorneys.71

Lieutenant Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon
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In August of 1945, in preparation for the trials, numerous men gave written statements and
testified against high-ranking officers. One of these men was Sucha Singh, a Sikh of the 7th/8th
Punjab Regiment. In his testimony against Lieutenant Dhillon, Sucha Singh accounted for how he
came to join the INA and his experience as an officer. He reported that he had joined the British
Indian Army in January of 1933. Sucha Singh was one of the many Indian soldiers captured when
the Japanese seized Singapore in February of 1942. Singh spent the next year of his life as a POW
in a camp at Jitra. In March of 1943, two INA officers came to give lectures, as Singh put it, at the
camp to convince the men to join the INA. The first was Major Dara, who promised POWs that
the INA would fight only in India for the sole purpose of freeing India from the British. He assured
them that while the INA would fight alongside the Japanese, the INA was also prepared to fight
against the Japanese should they betray them once inside India’s borders. Major Dara concluded
his “lecture” by telling the men that the INA was their best option and that nearly all other Indian
POWs had already joined. The second man to lecture was the accused, Lieutenant Dhillon. Sucha
Singh made a point to note Dhillon’s clothing. He was not wearing his badges of rank for the
Indian Army, but instead a gold bar with a gold star. He also wore a beard and a pagri (a turban),
which Singh characterized as “Sikh fashion.” Dhillon reiterated the same points as Dara,
emphasizing that the right decision was clear. Sucha Singh then testified that a month after these
speeches, he went on to volunteer for the INA, where he quickly rose through the ranks in Burma
and Myingyan. Singh seemed to have been convinced to join the INA by the words and roles of
both Dara and Dhillon, a fellow Sikh.72
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Another Sikh officer provided his testimony against Lieutenant Dhillon in August of 1945
as part of the INA trials. Kaka Singh of the 6th/1st Punjab Battalion joined the British Indian Army
in February of 1940. He was also captured during the Japanese takeover of Singapore. He was
moved from various camps until March of 1943 when he was finally moved to Taiping. At Taiping,
Kaka Singh saw Lieutenant Dhillon for the first time during a lecture. Like Sucha Singh, Kaka
Singh made a point to mention that Lieutenant Dhillon wore “Sikh fashion” (a beard and a Pagri)
and that he had a gold bar and star on his shoulders. According to Kaka Singh, Dhillon told the
men that he already lectured at Singapore and Jitra and those men had all joined the INA. Dhillon
informed the men that the INA would push the British out of India and that if they did not join the
INA, they “would get in trouble.” Dhillon also assured Kaka Singh and the others not to worry
because even if the INA failed, only the Senior Officers would be blamed and punished. Kaka
Singh concluded his testimony by stating that 15-20 days after Dhillon’s lecture, the men were
taken to Singapore under Japanese guard and there they volunteered for the INA. During the cross
examination that followed his testimony, Kaka Singh told Captain Shah Nawaz Khan that he only
volunteered in Singapore because officers and clerks at the station threatened the men with jail
time if they did not volunteer.73
As the trials formally began in November of 1945, they were highly publicized and
politicalized. The Indian public was deeply invested in the fates of Khan, Dhillon, and Sahgal.
British intelligence agencies reported that they had rarely seen such investment and widespread
sympathy, especially across communal lines. Trial transcripts were released to the public daily and
were read immediately. Indians celebrated INA week and INA day to applaud their patriotism and
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show their support. People engaged in protests, closed their businesses, and donated money to their
relief fund. Other protests turned violent when police shot into crowds. Full-fledged riots broke
out in cities like Calcutta, Allahabad, Karachi, and Rawalpindi. This sentiment bled into the army
as well. Soldiers had openly donated money to the INA fund and others had attended protests in
uniform. Ultimately, in December of 1945, Khan, Dhillon, and Sahgal were convicted only of the
treason charge, yet the sentence was never carried out and the men were released due to the public
response to the trials.74

Mutineers march through Bombay on February 19th, 1946

The situation with the INA trials escalated from bad to worse in February of 1946 when
soldiers in the Royal-Indian Navy (RIN) mutinied. It began on February 18th in Bombay when
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soldiers aboard the HMIS Talawar broke out in protest of poor food and discrimination by British
officers. The protests quickly spread to other boats on the harbor. These soldiers would then
proceed through the streets of Bombay carrying a portrait of Subhas Chandra Bose, who had died
in August of 1945 in a plane crash. Their boats raised the flags of the Congress Party, the Muslim
League, and the Communist Party. The mutiny then spread further north, reaching RIN ships
stationed outside of Karachi. At its peak, 78 ships and 20,000 men were involved in the mutiny.
In Karachi, soldiers engaged in protest and took to the streets. The men had several demands. First,
only Indians as commanding officers. Second, the release of remaining INA prisoners and other
war-time prisoners. Third, the withdrawal of all Indian troops from Indonesia. By communicating
using the ship’s signals, the mutiny continued to spread through the navy and then moved into the
army, as well as the air force. This mutiny took the form of insubordination, failure to eat or work,
and the protesters demanded their grievances be settled (pay, paid leave, demobilization, etc.) The
British were ultimately able to shut down the mutiny with the help of pleas and reassurances from
Vallabhbhai Patel, a leader within the Congress Party, and Jinnah. The mutineers were met with
enthusiastic support and strikes broke out in Bombay, which resulted in troops being sent and the
affair was violently put down. Even more than the INA trials themselves; this mutiny left a lasting
impression on the British. They realized that the British Indian Army was not under their control
and the soldiers had developed a political awareness the British had not thought possible, and it
extended beyond the impact of the INA trials alone.75

Conclusion
There were very clear challenges and contradictions to martial race theory during the
Second World War. The need for a larger fighting force and problems recruiting within the
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traditional classes meant that the British needed to expand the ranks of the army to other Indian
groups. This expansion alarmed some of the more conservative British officials, like leaders in
GHQ, while others embraced the change out of pragmatism and political necessity, such as Lord
Linlithgow. Others, like Lord Wavell, expressed more nuanced views about the expansion of the
army. The relationship between the Sikhs and the British had been slowly deteriorating since the
1920s and the war, as well as Muslim League politics, made the situation worse. Sikh mutiny in
Egypt made some officials question their loyalty and label them as troublemakers, while others
maintained that they were the steadfast soldiers they had always been. The year 1942, with the
Japanese landing at India’s door and the chaos of Quit India, shocked and terrified many officials
within the Raj. Believing the whole system was about to collapse upon them all, British officials
were looking for threats around every corner and believed those outside of the martial classes were
not as trustworthy or reliable in such perilous times. The Indian National Army, in its demographic
makeup and messaging, contradicted the supposed connection between race and loyalty, as well
as ideas about pervasive communal division. All Indian groups were represented in the INA and
martial groups, like Sikhs and Punjabi Muslims, were the largest groups of participants. In the
INA’s messaging, Captain Mohan Singh and especially Subhas Chandra Bose pushed the idea of
an Indian national identity where community and religion did not matter, but being a patriot, an
Indian nationalist, did. All in all, martial race theory was challenged by the experience of the
Second World War. Some officials were forced to reexamine their beliefs, adopting new ideas
about Indian groups and loyalty or at least more nuanced ones. Martial race theory, however,
persisted in other ways. Some British officials remained ardent believers, while Sikhs are still
overrepresented in the modern Indian Army. Like most colonial legacies, martial race theory
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remains entrenched in Indian society, even if in quiet and deeply buried ways, and will somehow
take more than a global, total war to unearth and dispose of it.

